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ABSTRACT  
This paper discusses the constitutional provisions relating to Fiji’s Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC). While many Pacific jurisdictions have inherited the British Westminster 
system, there is variation in their constitutions with regards to PACs -- specifically the 
mandate, composition, and leadership of the PAC. Most research and international best 
practice recommends that PACs must be chaired by a non-government member and should 
also be dominated by non-government members. Such a structure is argued to enhance the 
independence of PACs, which will in turn lead to a more effective scrutiny of government 
spending. While some Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have PAC provisions stipulated in 
their constitutions, the authority of PACs in Fiji stems from Parliamentary Standing Orders. 
The differences in the constitutional authority of PACs provides greater discretion to Fiji’s 
Parliament, and other countries in the Pacific with similar structures, to change aspects of 
PACs. In 2014, the Fiji Parliament made an unprecedented move to amend Standing Orders, 
which allows a Government member to chair the PAC. Fiji’s case highlights post-colonial 
states’ growing awareness that the “rules of the game” can be changed and may be a catalyst 
for other PICs to circumvent parliamentary oversight systems and institutions.  
Keywords: Public Accounts Committees, Public Accountability, Constitutional Design, 
Parliament, Fiji, Pacific 
 
																																								 																				




At a nation’s foundation, constitutions represent the beliefs and values of the people it 
governs.  One may also argue that constitutions are used to introduce and instil certain beliefs 
and values in the nation it governs.  This notion could be illustrated in Westminster-styled 
constitutions of post-colonial nations.   
The term ‘Westminster system’ describes shades of the British system of parliamentary 
government that the British Empire introduced to its colonies.2 It generally includes: an 
executive, legislature or parliament, and judiciary, which are (at least in theory) independent 
of each other; an elected house or houses of parliament, in which the executive or cabinet is 
selected from and responsible to parliament; and a head of state who is neither a member of 
nor elected from parliament.3 
As the representative arm of government in a democracy,4 parliament is generally considered 
the most representative institution of the Westminster system and the cornerstone of 
democracy per se.5 The parliamentary system allows for the establishment of parliamentary 
committees mandated to aid parliament in carrying out its functions.6   This is evident in the 
formation of a Public Accounts Committee (PAC), generally tasked to examine public 
accounts and produce parliamentary reports that hold government accountable for its use of 
public funds and resources.7  
Extensive focus on PACs reflects its vital role in enhancing parliamentary oversight of 
government’s financial operations. The committee contributes to parliamentary democracy 
																																								 																				
2 Kate Jones and Kerry Jacobs, ‘Governing the Government: The Paradoxical Place of the Public Accounts 
Committee’ (2006) 21 (1) Australasian Parliamentary Review: Journal of the Australasian Study of Parliament 
Group 63, 72. 
3 ibid. 
4 Graham Hassall, ‘Governance, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law in the South Pacific’, in Anita Jowitt and Tess 
Newton Cain (eds), Passage of Change: Law,Society and Governance in the South Pacific (2003). It is 
acknowledged that there are different approaches to democratic structure and procedure. Discussing these 
multiple approaches, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 Graham Hassall, ‘Pacific Island Parliaments: Developmental Aspirations and Political Realities’ (2012) 27(1) 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 213. 
6 Word Bank Institute, PAC in Commonwealth Small Country Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis, 
Parliamentary Strengthening Program. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/parliament.pdf One 
of the three core duties of any parliament is overseeing the implementation of government policies and 
programs using its accountability function. 
7 David McGee, The Overseers: Public Accounts Committees and Public Spending (2002) 55. Its terms of 
reference can be expressed narrowly by concentrating on financial probity and regularity or its terms of 
reference can be expressed more widely by being conceived in performance audit terms, with the PAC being 
charged with examining the effectiveness of programmes in achieving their objectives. 
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and, in turn, assists in protecting the nation and peoples’ interests as a whole.8 The ability of 
parliaments to deliver effective oversight, however, has greatly fluctuated due to either 
insufficient parliamentary resources or as a result of leaders circumventing laws to protect 
personal political interests.9  
This paper explores whether constitutional provisions (or lack thereof) affect public 
accountability in relatively young Westminster-styled democracies. It particularly examines 
how laws, such as the constitution, could be used to empower or curtail PACs’ mandate, 
composition, and independence (or at least the public’s perception of such independence).  
Most parliaments that are inheritors of a Westminster system of government include a form 
of PAC in their structure.10 Amongst former British colonies in the Pacific, Fiji and Solomon 
Islands have adopted such Westminster parliamentary practices. The former has generally 
maintained the British practice of authorising PACs solely through parliamentary rules, 
whilst the latter has also incorporated constitutional provisions safeguarding the institution’s 
mandate. Focusing on Fiji, this paper discusses whether fluctuations in the mandate and 
composition of Fiji’s PAC could be ignited or exacerbated by a lack of substantive 
constitutional authority that provides an enabling environment for the PAC to function 
effectively in a young and diverse democracy. The issue of express constitutional provisions 
for PAC’s composition and mandate is worth discussing as a possible avenue for 
strengthening Fiji’s PAC. Whether or to what extent such conventions may impact or be 
influenced by the peoples’ belief systems, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Global research indicates that PACs are predominantly chaired by an opposition member. A 
World Bank Institute study stated that ‘[w]hile a majority of PACs, independent of size, 
reported that the PAC chair was a member of the opposition, this was more likely to be the 
case in small states (78%) vis-à-vis their large state counterparts (54%). The reason behind 
such tendency is unclear; however, it could be attributed to the size of the majority party and 
																																								 																				
8 Word Bank Institute, above n 5. At this juncture, it is important to note that parliaments’ accountability 
functions more broadly because PACs do not operate in isolation.  Rather, these oversight committees are 
embedded in a given accountability environment that impacts -either directly or indirectly- on its performance.  
Although such ‘operational context’ may be a significant predictor of PAC capacities, thorough discussions of 
all possible operational factors is beyond the scope of this paper. 
9 Graham Hassall, above n 3. 
10 Rick Stapenhurst et al, ‘Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public Accounts 
Committees’ (Policy Research Working Paper No. 3613, World Bank, 2005). 
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their capacity to chair oversight committees or the strength of political parties in larger 
parliaments and the influence party discipline may have on determining who chairs.11 In over 
two thirds of Commonwealth countries, the PACs are chaired by non-government members.12 
While opposition forces control, on average, only 41.2% of the seats in Pacific PACs, they 
control 50% of the PAC chairpersons.13 In Australia and New Zealand, PACs’ independence 
is questioned because about 80% of their PACs have government chairs (albeit the Australian 
Capital Territory’s (ACT) PAC is led by the Opposition and Tasmania’s by an Independent 
member), 70% have a government majority (except New Zealand, Tasmania and ACT) and, 
despite most jurisdictions with a government chair having a corresponding opposition deputy, 
some (New South Wales, for example) have a government chair, a government deputy chair 
and a majority of government members.14 
Given that the committee’s independence is interwoven with its effectiveness, it could be 
argued that having a government chair hinders PACs’ independence and limits the scope of 
its inquiries.15  PACs chaired by the opposition are believed to be more effective than PACs 
chaired by government. These conclusions, first advanced by McGee16 and reiterated by 
Stapenhurst,17 reflect perceptions of PAC chairpersons who were asked to indicate what they 
regarded as important for the success of their committee. PACs require an opposition chair 
because the opposition has the ideal political interest required to critique government’s use of 
public funds and resources.18 
Recent research, however, indicates that an opposition chair does not ensure PAC 
effectiveness. Pelizzo’s correlation analysis reveals that contrary to what [surveyed] PAC 
chairpersons had suggested and to what previous studies had assumed, the activity of a PAC 
committee is not enhanced by the fact that the PAC chairperson belongs to the opposition.19 
Some studies also report that opposition chairs actually result in ‘fewer committee meetings, 
																																								 																				
11 Word Bank Institute, above n 5. 
12 David McGee, above n 6. 
13 Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Public Accounts Committee in the Pacific Region’ (2010) 38(1) Politics and Policy 117-
137. 
14 Rick Stapenhurst et al, above n 9.  
15 ibid.  
16 David McGee, above n 6. 
17 Rick Stapenhurst et al, above n 9.  
18 This argument is linked to Kolberg’s instrumentalist-relativist theory, which states that politicians are more 
likely to implement policies that the people feel strongly about because it ensures that their political power 
remains intact. Critically questioning government spending helps the opposition argue it would make a better 
governor than the current government.  
19 Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Public Accounts Committees in the Commonwealth: Oversight, Effectiveness, and 
Governance’ (2011) 49(4) Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 528, 544. 
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fewer inquiries, and fewer reports’.20 Since a government member has greater access to 
government ministers, having a PAC chaired by a government member ensures PAC 
recommendations are heard and effectively implemented by government.21 
Furthermore, there is a wide variety in terms of the authority under which PACs operates. 
Some jurisdictions utilise parliament’s standing orders alone whilst others provide express 
constitutional provisions and legislations outlining the mandate and composition of the PAC.  
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE PAC IN THE PACIFIC 
Pacific Island Countries have similar as well as distinct constitutional spheres.  Many have 
grappled with post-colonialism and its accompanying practices and conventions. Fiji and 
Solomon Islands, for example, are no exception – particularly in regard to challenges 
associated with politics in a multi-cultural democracy permeated by diverse traditional 
custom.  
Since independence, Fiji has journeyed through four Constitutions following coup d'états and 
political unrests. Solomon Islands, on the other hand, had generally upheld the Constitution 
that established its independence but, following ethnic unrests, is currently discussing a new 
federal constitution.   
The Pacific Islands’ Constitutions generally echo a Westminster system inherited from 
colonisers, United Kingdom. Both have constitutional provisions for the legal authority and 
composition of a legislature or parliament.  Accordingly, Fiji and Solomon Islands’ 
parliamentary systems follow the beaten path of establishing PACs to ensure government 
accountability, transparency, and good governance. Differences, however, lie in the legal 
authorities under which their respective PACs operate. 	
A glance at the legal backbone of Fiji’s PAC 
Fiji’s Constitution lays the foundational blocks for government oversight systems and 
institutions. Section 1(f) and (g) of the 2013 Constitution states the sovereign democracy is 
‘founded on the values of – …good governance, including the limitation and separation of 
powers [and] transparency and accountability’.  These provisions are somewhat similar to 
those of the 1970, 1990, and 1997 Constitutions; which all have established variants of 
																																								 																				
20 Riccardo Pelizzo, above n 13, 129. 
21 Rick Stapenhurst et al, above n 9. 
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parliamentary authority and composition geared towards upholding such norms of 
governance.  
As aforementioned, PACs are a vital oversight institution in assisting parliament’s role in 
ensuring good governance.22 It provides checks and balances that guarantee the executive’s 
transparency in reporting government’s financial expenditures and helps to hold government 
accountable to the legislature for such expenditures. The PAC, in turn, is also important for 
maintaining a separation of powers –or at least the public perception of such independence.  
Despite these important factors, the 2013 Constitution does not expressly provide for the 
mandate and composition of a PAC. Instead, under sections 70 and 71, the Constitution 
generally authorises Parliament to formulate its own rules concerning parliamentary 
committees such as the PAC. Thus, Fiji’s parliamentary oversight systems are authorised and 
limited by Parliament’s Standing Orders. This has been the practice since Fiji’s 
independence.  
Fiji’s PAC operates under Parliament’s Standing Orders alone with no express constitutional 
or legislative authority. This may be due to the direct transplant of British oversight systems; 
as the United Kingdom’s PAC was established by its Parliament’s Standing Orders and 
continues to operate under it. The British parliamentary system, however, has amassed 
centuries’ worth of substantial legal norms and traditional culture that safeguard 
parliamentary democracy in a sovereignty that has an unwritten Constitution.  Fiji’s 
parliamentary oversight system, on the other hand, is still finding its footing in a uniquely 
diverse post-colonial setting that has evolved through four Constitutions.  
A Potted History of Fiji’s PAC  
Fiji’s PAC is dynamic – ‘dynamic’ in the sense of its fluctuations fuelled by four coup d'états 
and multiple political and social unrests.23 Over the years, the PAC’s composition has greatly 
changed. Parliament Standing Orders prior to the 2006 political upheaval stated the 
Committee must: consist of twelve members nominated by the Prime Minister and Leader of 
the Opposition; have a quorum of eight members; and maintain a Chairperson from the 
																																								 																				
22 Usman Chohan and Kerry Jacobs, ‘A Parliamentary Budget Office in Fiji: Scope and Possibility’ (2016) 31(2) 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 117. 
23 However, this paper only discusses the PAC between the years 2006-2016. The PAC’s functions and 
composition prior 2006 exceeds the scope of this paper. Shortcomings of such discussions and opportunities for 
further research on the matter are noted.  
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Opposition.24 This structure was relatively followed when the Committee resumed its 
functions -- somewhat, in the political context -- during Bainimarama’s military rule by 
decree.25 After the 2014 General Elections, however, the PAC’s composition was drastically 
reduced to less than half of the previous number. 
At its first sitting, the newly elected Parliament adopted the 2014 Standing Orders.26  This 
replaced the 1999 Standing Orders that governed previous PACs.27 Although the Opposition 
was guaranteed leadership of the Committee,28 PAC membership was reduced from twelve to 
‘no fewer than five and no more than seven members’.29 The Committee now comprised of 
two Opposition members and three Government members.30 
Later, following its 11 February 2016 sitting, Parliament approved a motion brought by the 
Attorney-General to remove the provision in Standing Order 117 that guaranteed the 
Opposition leadership of the PAC.31 The Opposition, unsurprisingly, protested that such 
amendments prevented effective scrutiny of Government’s finances and hindered democratic 
parliamentary debate.32  
The content and manner of this amendment stirred much debate, outcry, and criticism. It 
forms the genesis of this paper’s discussion question – that is, whether Fiji’s 2013 
Constitution provides an enabling environment for an effective parliamentary oversight 
system through the PAC.  
The Fijian Context: Amendments to PAC Standing Orders  
For Fiji’s PAC, extant literature should not be applied without taking the Fijian context into 
account. Wehner argues that, despite its importance in the structure of parliamentary scrutiny, 
the committee’s usefulness and status are also dependent on external factors such as 
																																								 																				
24.Riccardo Pelizzo, above n 13. 
25 ibid. 
26 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Hansard 6 October 2014 www.parliament.gov.fj (Accessed 27 August 
2016). 
27 ibid.  
28ibid; Standing Order 117(2)(a) states ‘the Standing Committee on Public Accounts may only elect an 
opposition member as chairperson’.  
29 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, above n 25; Standing Order 114 (1).  
30 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Committee Members www.parliament.gov.fj (Accessed 17 August 2016). 




resourcing levels and political environments.33 This discussion, however, particularly focuses 
on Fiji’s political context and its impact in shaping Fiji’s current PAC.34  
In contextualizing relevant amendments, one must briefly consider the PAC’s activities 
leading up to the amendments. In May 2015, the PAC produced a consolidated report on the 
Auditor General’s 2007-2009 report. It outlined 29 systematic issues and recommendations 
for Government.35 This was the first substantial test of new accountability systems for Fiji’s 
return to parliamentary democracy after the 2014 General Elections under the new 2013 
Constitution.  
Subsequently, the PAC commenced an inquiry into the allocation of funds from Head 50 in 
Government’s budget. The Deputy Auditor-General advised the PAC that Head 50 was 
mainly for contingency matters that are not covered in the budget and it caters for unforeseen 
circumstances during the year.36 From this contingency fund, ministries are able to obtain 
funds through a small grant scheme, which is where ad hoc funds received by the Finance 
Ministry are deposited into a consolidated account and released to ministries accordingly.37 
The Office of the Auditor General highlighted that these funds were used without the 
provision of acquittals and that the Finance Ministry continuously released funds despite such 
poor practice.38 A series of exchanges between the former PAC chair, Professor Biman 
Prasad and the Attorney General (who is also the Finance Minister) followed via traditional 
and social media.39 These inquiries were amongst the most controversial activities of the PAC 
since its reestablishment after the 2014 Elections.  
																																								 																				
33 Joachim Wehner, ‘Principles and Patterns of Financial Scrutiny: Public Accounts Committees in the 
Commonwealth’ (2003) 41(3) Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/wehner/pacs.pdf (Accessed 2 October 2016).  
34 Thorough discussion on the extent of PAC resourcing and its impact on PAC effectiveness is beyond the 
scope of this discussion; room for further analysis is acknowledged.  
35 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, ‘Consolidated report on the Auditor General’s report 2007-2009’, 
Committees – Standing Committee on Public Accounts www.parliament.gov.fj (Accessed 1 October 2016). 
36 Vuniwaqa Bola-Bari, ‘No Answers for $100m Question’ The Fiji Times (Suva, Fiji) 06 August 2015 
http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=316658 (Accessed 12 August 2016). It is interesting to 
note that verbatim reports of these 2015 PAC inquiries are not available on the Fiji Parliament website, which 
only provides verbatim transcripts of recent PAC meetings held in 2016. Thus, discussions on these inquiries 
heavily rely upon secondary sources such as newspaper articles and the Parliament Hansard.  
37 Vuniwaqa Bola-Bari, above n 35.  
38 ibid. 
39 ibid; The Fijian Government, ‘Attorney-General And Minister For Finance, Public Enterprises, Public Service 
And Communications Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum Transcript Of Remarks To The Press On Media Reporting Of 
$100 Million Funds’, Fiji Government Portal Media Centre, 23 September 2015 http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-
Center/Press-Releases/ATTORNEY-GENERAL-AND-MINISTER-FOR-FINANCE,-PUBLIC-.aspx (Accessed 
5 October 2016); Litia Cava, ‘$100m Not Missing, Stresses A-G’, Fiji Sun Online (Suva, Fiji) 23 September 
2015 http://fijisun.com.fj/2015/09/23/100m-not-missing-stresses-a-g/ (Accessed 5 October 2016).  
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In 2016, the Government then sought to amend Parliament’s Standing Orders on the PAC. 
Standing Order 117 was amended to remove provisions that guaranteed the Opposition PAC 
leadership.40 Government argued the PAC had become very political and thus, was acting 
beyond its jurisdiction.41 It justified such changes were needed to realign the PAC with its 
proper mandate.42 According to the Attorney-General, the Committee was not doing its job 
properly because its Chairperson was politically motivated.43 The Minister retracted earlier 
election’s manifesto that guaranteed Opposition PAC leadership because, according to 
Government, the PAC Chair had failed to follow proper oversight conventions by meddling 
into speculations and giving arbitrary rulings and political rants via the media.44 Government 
reiterated that Parliament needed to focus on the actual specific mandate of various 
committees and thus, Standing Orders on the PAC had to be amended accordingly.  
Government also clarified that the amendment does not impact the PAC’s independence to 
choose its own Chairperson.45 Standing Order 117 states the ‘Committee shall vote’ a 
Chairperson.46 Thus, an Opposition member is still able to chair the PAC if supported by 
majority PAC members. Moreover, Government justified amendments were in-line with 
Australia and New Zealand parliamentary practice –where PACs are chaired by government 
members without outcry from the opposition and public.47 
Comparative analysis,48 however, is not as simple as the Government presents it. Fiji’s PAC 
and parliamentary system may not be directly comparable to larger systems like Australia and 
New Zealand. A global PAC survey noted that PACs in larger states had more available 
																																								 																				
40 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji Hansard, above n 30. 
41 Avinash Kumar, ‘Fiji’s New Parliament and Democracy’ (2016) 14 State Society & Governance in 
Melanesia, The Australian National University In Brief 
http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2016-05/ib-2016-14-kumar.pdf 
(Accessed 12 August 2016).  




46 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Revised Sanding Orders with track changes www.parliament.gov.fj 
(Accessed 17 August 2016). 
47 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Hansard 12 February 2016 www.parliament.gov.fj (Accessed 27 August 
2016). 
48 Comparative analysis in this regard includes the concept of comparative law, which is ‘the study of, and 
research in, law by the systematic comparison of two or more legal systems; or of parts, branches or aspects of 
two or more legal systems’; W.J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’, (1974) 23(3) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Kamba explains the dangers of taking law/policy from one 
jurisdiction and applying it to another without considering the social, cultural, economic, and political context in 
which the law/policy functioned in.  
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resources to effectively perform their oversight role compared to PACs in smaller states.49 It 
is noted that where a PAC has a government chair, there are other transparency and 
accountability mechanisms that ensure proper scrutiny of public funds.50 Economist, Neelesh 
Gounder, stated that there is no comparison between the Australian context and the Fijian 
context as Australia has other accountability mechanisms, freedom of information laws, a 
strong and competitive media, and many specialised NGOs ensuring the Committee’s 
independence and effectiveness – which is vastly different from Fiji’s civil service, 
information laws and governance machinery.51 Australia’s PAC is also governed by the 
Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act (1951) whereas Fiji’s PAC has no similar 
legislative authority.   
Additionally, the Fiji Government holds absolute majority of Parliament (32/50 seats) and the 
PAC (3/5 members).52 Voting results, therefore, are likely to go in Government’s favour. A 
result in favour of the Opposition is also challenging due to the unlikelihood of voting against 
party-lines. This is because members may risk suspension or vacation of their seat if they 
vote against their political party’s mandate.  Section 63(1)(g) and (i) of the 2013 Constitution 
empowers party leaders to effectively remove a member from Parliament by expelling such 
member from the political party. Subsection (h) further allows political parties to remove 
members who vote against party policies without first obtaining the party’s consent.  These 
provisions place substantial pressure on members to vote in favour of their party’s mandate. 
Thus, given the Constitution’s supremacy, it is arguable that Standing Order 117 merely 
encompasses the letter and not the spirit of PAC independence.  
 
Furthermore, many Opposition members were also concerned with the way such amendments 
were brought to Parliament. They argued that the Attorney-General’s motion to amend 
Standing Orders should have been brought by the Standing Orders Committee, as stated in 
Standing Order 128.53 Opposition member Hon. Ratu Tikoca protested that Parliament’s 
procedures clearly stipulated proposed amendments needed to be referred to the Standing 
																																								 																				
49 Word Bank Institute, above n 5.  
50 ibid. 
51 Neelesh Gounder, ‘Leadership of PAC’, The Fiji Times (Suva, Fiji) 20 February 2016 
http://fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=342309  (Accessed 15 August 2016).  Neelesh Gounder is a faculty member 
of the School of Economics at the University of the South Pacific, where he teaches economics of governance. 
52 Avinash Kumar, above n 41.  
53 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Standing Orders www.parliament.gov.fj  (Accessed 26 August 2016); 
Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Hansard, above n 46.  
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Order Committee (of which he is a member of), and the Committee then deliberates on the 
matter after extensive public consultations before advising Parliament.54 Since these 
processes were not followed, the Opposition labelled PAC amendments as a totalitarian tactic 
signifying the lack of true parliamentary democracy in Fiji and ‘virtually entrenching 
parliamentary dictatorship’.55 These sentiments were shared by other commentators who 
reasoned such practice was possible because Government held absolute majority of 
Parliament.56 Thus, it is arguable that Government holds the pen that writes the rules for 
Fiji’s Parliamentary oversight systems; as amendments to Standing Orders, generally, do not 
require stringent processes compared to legislative or constitutional amendments. 
DISCUSSION 
From studying Fiji’s PAC, the possible impact of constitutional provisions detailing 
parliamentary oversight systems is highlighted. Lack of express provisions for Fiji’s PAC in 
its 2013 Constitution may have indirectly enabled various changes to the Committee’s 
mandate and composition. This is coupled with a political context that empowers the 
Executive to determine the rules of Parliament - largely due to its ability to influence majority 
Members of Parliament (MPs) and regulations that principally aids this dominance in 
Parliament. Such regulations not only include those provided by Parliament’s Standing 
Orders but also provisions in the Constitution that protect political parties’ interests in 
Parliament. Section 63(h) of the Constitution, for example, states that a member’s 
Parliamentary seat becomes vacant if the member ‘votes or abstains from voting in 
Parliament contrary to any direction issued by [the member’s] political party…without 
obtaining the prior permission of the political party’.  This provision, in effect, could 
contribute to significant pressures on Government MPs to support the Executive’s proposed 
amendments to Standing Orders concerning the PAC – even if, in the MPs’ personal 
opinions, such amendments may contradict values of good governance, accountability and 
																																								 																				
54 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, Hansard, above n 46.  
55 ibid. It is worth noting that Opposition members boycotted the debate by either failing to be present or 
walking out of the Parliamentary session before the amendment was voted on.  Amendments to Standing Order 
117 were therefore unanimously passed.  
56 Avinash Kumar, above n 41; Tess Newton Cain, ‘Now You See It ... Now You Don’t: How to Make 
Democracy Disappear’ Vanuatu Daily Post (Port Vila, Vanuatu) 17 February 2016 
http://dailypost.vu/news/now-you-see-it-now-you-don-t-how-to/article_022e54b8-2fef-5de6-8adc-
28a119f6748d.html (Accessed 12 August 2016).  
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transparency stated in section 1(f) and (g) of the Constitution.57  Moreover, Standing Orders 
prescribing the PAC’s mandate and composition could be easily amended.  
One may argue that such amendments would have been subject to challenge if the PAC’s 
mandate and composition was expressly provided by the Constitution – similar to provisions 
in Solomon Island’s Constitution or those outlined in the Ghai Commission’s 2012 Draft 
Constitution. This is because procedures for amending the 2013 Constitution, outlined in 
section 160, provide several hurdles to overcome. Any amendment58 to the Constitution 
requires that: a special designation of a Bill must be presented for such amendments, which is 
read three times in Parliament; a special majority of three-quarters of MPs should support 
proposed amendments at the Bill’s second and third readings; a special report must be 
presented to the Legislature; and a referendum should be conducted by the Electoral 
Commission, the outcome of which  ‘is that [a special majority] of three-quarters of the total 
number of the registered voters have voted in favour of the Bill’ [emphasis added]. These 
procedural requirements may be challenging to follow given Fiji’s political environment, 
electorate characteristics, and resourcing levels.59  
As such, without any constitutional provisions expressly concerning the PAC, Standing 
Orders governing the PAC have undergone various amendments. This is not to say, however, 
that implementing such constitutional provisions would prevent any amendment to standing 
orders per se. Rather, it is submitted that having constitutional provisions on the PAC’s 
mandate, membership and leadership would mean that the Executive (with majority seats of 
Parliament) cannot use Standing Orders to circumvent parliamentary oversight systems and 
principles of good governance, transparency, and accountability entrenched in the 
Constitution.  
As aforementioned, recent Standing Order amendments include the removal of the 
requirement for an Opposition Chair of the PAC. Although recent literature favour a 
government chair,60 this may negatively affect public perception and faith in a PAC that is led 
by a government chairperson with a government deputy chair and a majority of government 
members. Fiji’s NGO Coalition on Human Rights says accountability is key to realising 
																																								 																				
57 Which, in turn, further blurs the separation of powers between the Executive and Legislature.  
58  Section 160(7) further states the term “amendment” should be interpreted as also applying to proposals to 
repeal, replace, revise, or alter any provision of the Constitution.  
59 Further discussions on the subject is beyond the scope of this paper. .  
60 Riccardo Pelizzo, above n 19.   
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human rights and public perceptions and faith in the PAC’s independence and credibility is 
gravely undermined with the appointment of a government member as PAC chair.61 Agreeing 
with a Tebbutt Times Poll where the majority of those surveyed had said Government should 
give the Opposition more input and opportunity to help in the running of the country, the 
Leader of Opposition stated ‘there is almost no process of inclusion between the Government 
and the Opposition.62 
Nevertheless, it is possible for a government member to effectively chair Fiji’s PAC without 
hindering its independence and credibility. To ensure such effectiveness and independence, 
however, the PAC should have a larger proportion of opposition members than government 
members. Currently Fiji’s PAC comprises of three Government members and two Opposition 
members. The Committee Chair and Deputy Chair are both Government members, whilst the 
second Opposition member is yet to be decided63 after the removal of the Opposition chair 
and his subsequent resignation from the committee.64 Pelizzo states ‘[i]f the productivity of 
PACs in the Pacific region is to be enhanced, it is better to have smaller committees, with a 
larger proportion of opposition members and with government chairpersons than having, as 
previous studies had claimed, bigger committees and opposition chairpersons’.65 Fiji 
currently satisfies two of these elements with its small Committee chaired by a Government 
member. With that said, Fiji should consider increasing Opposition members to provide for 
effective scrutiny of public funds without being pressured by the Government’s demands.66   
However, some argue Fiji’s context is not conducive for an independent PAC chaired by 
Government. This is because additional amendments made to the PAC’s functions may 
hinder effective scrutiny. Standing Order 109(2)(d) now includes ‘[t]he committee must only 
examine how public money has been dealt with and accounted for in accordance with the 
written law and must not examine the merits of the underlying policy that informs public 
spending’.67 Some critique that while Government has felt the need to adopt the Australian 
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system of having a government chair, it has chosen to not adopt the same powers awarded to 
Australian PACs.68 Section 8(1) of the Australian PAC Act describes the Committee's 
specific duties as being to ‘report to both Houses of the Parliament, with such comment as it 
thinks fit, on any items or matters in those accounts, statements and reports, or any 
circumstances connected with them, that the committee thinks should be drawn to the 
attention of the Parliament’.69 This provision is somewhat similar to Solomon Islands’ 
Parliamentary Standing Orders mandating its PAC. The PACs’ of New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom also scrutinises the value for money, economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of public spending.70  
In Fiji, the Opposition argues amendments hinder the PAC’s ability to conduct a merits 
review of Government’s policies and its benefits for nation building.71 Some argue ‘if a 
government policy is spending money badly, then it is the role of PAC to scrutinise that 
policy and bring the issues to Parliament…what use is it for the PAC to say "all the money 
was spent as the rules required" if the spending rules are bad in the first place’.72 Conversely, 
others state PACs should not determine policy itself but rather focus only on the 
implementation of that policy.73  
According to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), curtailing PACs’ 
oversight powers and limiting the input of opposition members is not in-line with 
parliamentary best practice.74 The opposition must be able to actively contribute and 
participate in the committee in order to ensure an effective PAC.75 Pacific Island parliaments 
are also encouraged to create an enabling environment for robust, constructive debates 
between the government and opposition, particularly in regards to PACs.76 Thus, a localised 
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approach is needed to improve Fiji’s parliamentary democracy and strengthen its oversight 
systems.  
Fiji needs a collaborative effort from Government and the Opposition to move Parliament 
forward toward a true democracy. As the peoples’ representatives in Parliament, the 
Opposition (and Government Backbenchers) should perform the oversight function by 
questioning the Executive.77 This function is the hallmark of parliamentary democracy.78 
Discussions on the type of collaborative effort required and its possible incentives and 
challenges, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Nevertheless, the challenge for PAC members, both in Government and Opposition, is to 
constrain the Executive.79 This, however, may be difficult considering limitations stipulated 
in the 2013 Constitution. As such, apart from identifying the powers and resources needed by 
Parliament and the PAC, the competence and skills of individual committee members are also 
crucial for the Committee’s success. The CPA Study Group identified three main priorities 
for action: 1) Capacity building; 2) Independence; and 3) Information exchange.80 There is a 
crucial need to improve institutional capability by enhancing the ability of Parliament, the 
PAC, and its members to carry out their functions with sufficient resources, adequate training 
and access to required expertise. PACs need to have the means to exchange information and 
ideas so as to keep up-to-date with important developments, changing standards and best-
practices as they emerge.81 Finally, it is also essential that PAC members are free from 
political or legal constraints that could inhibit them from performing their duties diligently 
and impartially. As aforementioned, section 63(1)(g)(h) and (i) of Fiji’s 2013 Constitution, 
for example, may effectively discourage government PAC members from diligently and 
impartially critiquing Government expenditure because of political pressure to appease their 
political party leaders to safeguard their parliamentary membership.    
If PAC members are to achieve the objective of scrutinising government expenditure, 
members need to be able to distinguish between their roles as members of political parties, 
and their role as a Committee member. The latter role is to represent the Parliament as an 
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entity, and the public generally, in holding Government to account.82 While it would be ideal 
for politicians and members of Government to act in the interests of the public, section 
63(1)(g)(h) and (i) of Fiji’s 2013 Constitution make it more likely that MPs would act in their 
political parties’ interests.  
The PAC in Fiji has become an increasingly public arena where members of the Government 
and the Opposition debate over public spending. Meetings of PACs in Fiji have received 
unprecedented media coverage on television, newspaper and on social media sites since the 
2014 General Election. The digital revolution in Fiji facilitated by recent ICT infrastructure 
developments and Fiji’s growing youth bulge has created a new online space for political 
discussion on social media sites.83 The Government as well as members of the Opposition are 
leveraging social media to manage public impression and in some cases to engage with the 
public.84 Arguably, such increased visibility and public scrutiny on both traditional and 
emergent forms of media may have compelled the Government to change the Standing 
Orders to allow a Government member to Chair the PAC. Such an option is not available in 
the case of Solomon Islands as the PAC’s mandate is expressly stipulated in the Constitution. 
Any amendments to the PAC would, therefore, need to be consistent with such Constitutional 
provisions.  
The Fiji PAC’s experience after the 2014 General Election highlights how, although the rules 
of the “game” were inherited from colonial powers, the Fiji Government is cognisant of its 
power to change these rules where necessary. While governments of Fiji always had such 
power, this is the first time (in recorded history) that any Fiji Government has used 
constitutional provisions (or lack thereof) to circumvent rules and processes pertaining to 
parliamentary oversight systems such as the PAC.  This could indicate that Bainimarama’s 
Government is more attuned to its constitutional powers. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fiji’s 2013 Constitution includes provisions for parliamentary oversight systems as it 
empowers Parliament to establish parliamentary committees tasked with ensuring that 
Parliament upholds the values of democracy, good governance, accountability and 
transparency stipulated in the Constitution. Within a few years into its return to democratic 
rule, however, the Fiji Government amended Parliamentary Standing Orders to remove 
requirements for an Opposition chair of the PAC and curtail the Committee’s mandate to 
investigate Government expenditure. Many have voiced their concerns, via traditional and 
social media, that such amendments are inconsistent with the principles of democracy, good 
governance, accountability and transparency enshrined in the Constitution.  
This paper has highlighted how constitutions may be used to empower or curtail 
parliamentary oversight systems, such as the PAC. It has sought to generate further 
discussions on developing a localised oversight system that strengthens the Committee’s 
institutional capacity to safeguard parliamentary democracy in Fiji. Although this paper 
merely discusses whether fluctuations in Fiji’s PAC mandate and composition could be 
ignited or exacerbated by a lack of substantive constitutional authority alongside related 
Standing Order amendments, it has briefly stated some possible recommendations that may 
interest further research and discussions. These include increasing the Opposition’s inclusion 
and participation in the Committee. 
It is conceded that discussions solely focused on constitutional provisions and the 
Opposition’s role in an effective PAC. The paper does not address other contributing factors 
such as increased PAC resources and capacity building.  It also solely focuses on the PAC’s 
operations with the Executive from 2006 and fails to analyse the PAC’s relations with other 
oversight institutions such as the Auditor General, including how constitutional provisions 
may strengthen effective and constructive relations. These limitations provide possible areas 
for further research in Fiji and the Pacific.  
Moreover, the implementation of identified recommendations, with further research and 
discussions on the matter, may ultimately assist Parliament in becoming the ‘bastion of 
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democracy it was established to be’.85 All in all, Fiji’s experience explores how different 
laws, including nations’ constitutions, could be used to empower or constrain parliamentary 
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